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Educational governance activities and the
rise of educational contagion in the
Islamic Maghreb
The case of Tunisia
Tavis D. Jules and Teresa Barton

Introduction
Educational governance activities1—the funding, provision, ownership, and
regulation of education (Dale 2005)—are no longer solely conducted by
state apparatuses, but are now a permanent feature and orthodoxy of the
»politics of education« at the transnational and transdiscursive levels. We
build upon the insights of the »pluri-scalar mechanisms of governance«
(Robertson, Bonal, and Dale 2002) to empirically conceptualize the
scalar dynamics of transitological educational governance activities and
politics in post-authoritarian and post-revolutionary settings and
contexts (hereinafter post-spaces) in comparative and international
education. We use a »historical-comparative or comparative-historical
approach« (Cowen 2000; Larsen 2010; Schriewer 2002), grounded in an
historical policy analysis (HPA) (Hanberger 2003; Jules 2013a; Jules
2013b; Schram 1993; Torgerson 1996) of national educational policies to
illustrate how various policy discourses arose in the post-authoritarian
period in Tunisia. Such a methodology illuminates how perceived
educational problems are first rescaled endogenously by exogenous
forces during different »transitologies«—the collapses of one empire and
1

Following Dale (2005) we use »educational governance activities« as a generic term to encompass the funding, provision, ownership, and regulation of education that may be carried out independently by different
actors that are endogenous or exogenous to the nation state.
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its replacement with another (Cowen 2000)—within the context of the
project of modernity. We see Tunisia’s post-spaces as consisting of the
(i) post-independence policyscape, (ii) post-Bourguiba policyscape (first
authoritarian president), and (iii) post-Ben Ali policyscape (second
authoritarian president). These post-spaces stem from some form of
regime change and from internal uprisings and have ultimately shaped
Tunisia’s transitologies.
A plethora of studies have concentrated on Tunisia’s political transitologies by illuminating the precipitous collapse of one of the most unwavering countries in the Arabic world (Chomiak and Entelis 2011; Schraeder
and Redissi 2011) by drawing attention to several internal factors. These
include its economic system and excessive unemployment (Hibou,
Meddeb, and Hamdi 2011), the three perceived myths (economic
miracle, democratic gradualism, and laicité2) credited to Ben Ali’s regime
(Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012), and the role of external actors (Youngs
2011) in the massive uprisings against the regime, as well as the
conceivable broader lessons that the Arabic world could learn from the
Jasmine Revolution (Murphy 2011; Pickard 2011). Few studies have
sought to empirically study the historical impact of Tunisia’s political
transitologies on educational governance activities. Governance in postspaces is a spatial scale based on the outcomes of struggles between
social forces that are embedded within the contestations of power and
capability (Robertson 2010). In focusing on Tunisia, the most recent
state to emerge within post-authoritarian spaces, our emphasis is on
understanding the political role of the »mukhabarat (intelligence-based)
police state [based on a] ›strong neo-corporatist state‹ or the ›force of
obedience‹ or an ›authoritarian syndrome‹« (Schraeder and Redissi 2011,
5–6) in relation to the role and function of education in Tunisian society.

2

laicité links economic underdevelopment closely with cultural and religious backwardness that had to be eliminated through subscription to
modernizing values and the French model of social development (see
Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012).
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This paper draws on political economy literature, particularly on the concept of »financial contagion,« to propose the rise of »educational contagion«—the spreading of ideas due to spillovers—within post-authoritarian and post-revolutionary spaces and across different scales. Financial
contagion occurs as a result of several small economic shocks that initially affect only a few institutions, a particular region or a specific section
of the economy, and then begin to spread across the entire economic
system. The ripple effects of these small shocks are driven by economic
fluctuations and ultimately lead to a tsunami of policy solutions. In
applying this concept to an empirical conceptualization of education in
post-authoritarian and post-revolutionary settings and contexts, we aim
to understand how educational policy ideas spread across various regions
of a country. We propose a »a model in which small shocks lead to large
effects by means of contagion, more precisely, in which a shock within a
single sector [such as education] can spread to other sectors and lead to
an economy wide financial crisis« (Allen and Gale 2000, 3). Apropos to
our argument, educational contagion outcomes may be derived from a
scalar empirical analysis of educational governance activities in postspaces. This paper suggests that countries are subjected to different
externalities as they construct imagined post-spaces or »imagined
communities« (Anderson 1991; see also Sadiki 2002) in the aftermath of
regime changes, since they are greatly influenced by regional and global
processes. Within this context, this paper sets out to argue that educational contagion, embedded within a broader framework of scales, is but
one empirical approach that we can use to understand how processes of
globalization and regional integration influence post-spaces. Our starting
point is the national policy level of the Tunisian educational system.
Simultaneously, we pay attention to the processes and actors above and
below the state level, since the pluri-scalar mechanisms of governance
allow us to understand the »coordination of activities, actors/agents and
scales through which education is constructed and delivered in national
societies« (Simons, Olssen, and Peters 2009, 78).
Our principal argument is that scales help us to understand the rise of
regulated educational governance activities and the subsequent outcome
3
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of educational contagion in a particular context. First, we recognize that
authoritarianism is a problematic concept to define and even more
precarious when applied to the nation-state (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005).
In conceptualizing educational governance activities, we draw on a variety of literatures in comparative and international education to show
how the different levels of »scale« (Robertson, Bonal, and Dale 2002;
Robertson 2012), the projectability of »scoptic systems« (Sobe and
Ortegon 2009), and the broader cultural, historical, and political
investigation of »vertical studies« (Bartlett and Vavrus 2011; Vavrus and
Bartlett 2006) within »policyscapes« (Carney 2009) provide an opportunity for us to consider the way in which policy ideas flow within and
between different aspects of the policy environment in post-spaces. We
use such an elaborate framework, giving these approaches a particular
treatment or viewing them through the »optique of globalization«
(Carney 2011), since one cannot study »post-spaces« in education
without locating and accounting for the various governance mechanisms
that have managed and regulated education prior to the emergence of
new spaces. Second, we make an assessment by employing an HPA
aimed at exploring the question of how educational policymaking has
been regulated and governed in Tunisia’s post-spaces. For us, education
is one of many regulated and governed aspects of the post-authoritarian
spaces that exist at different scalar levels in Tunisia. Third, this paper is
an attempt to scrutinize and wrestle with the nature of the problems that
confront post-authoritarian Tunisia in light of its historical past. This is
done by briefly reviewing the historical and post-independence aspects
of education in Tunisia. The premise of this essay suggests that even at
the height of authoritarianism in Tunisia, education was seen as essential
and as part of the regime’s civilizing mission. Finally, we gauge the Tunisian example by examining major reform agendas, along with the actors,
agents, and institutions that promoted them.

4
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Post-spaces as vertical comparisons, scopic systems, and
policyscapes
In examining the notion of scale in post-authoritarian spaces we draw on
the work of Robertson, Bonal, and Dale (2002) and Robertson (2012),
who argue that scales are constructs that take place at different levels
that are entwined and fixed through different processes. Struggles
between actors (political and others) may occur at any level within a scale
and consequently produce different outcomes. Thus pluri-scalar governance pays attention to how education is delivered and constructed as
well as to the power relations that arise during the coordination of activities, actors, and agents at different scales in post-spaces (Dale 2005;
Robertson, Bonal, and Dale 2002; Simons, Olssen, and Peters 2009;
Verger 2009). Whereas Dale’s (2005) work uses a priori elements to suggest that movement towards governance can be categorized by the
emergence of a multilayer or pluri-scalar process that involves non-state
actors/agents in national decision-making, our focus here is on the
posteriori conceptualization of governance activities regarding educational
politics. In building upon the existent governance research that pays
attention to the scales of governance (sub-national, national, and
supranational) in relation to the institutions or agents (state, market,
community, and household) that coordinate these various scales, resulting in the »coordination of coordination« (Dale 2005; Robertson, Bonal,
and Dale 2002), our work draws attention to the embryonic scalar dynamics of governance activities before they move up the decision-making
ladder to the transnational level (Mundy 2007). Educational governance
is multidimensional, multileveled, and multiscalar, and therefore,
educational governance activities in post-spaces take place at the
subnational, national, supranational or regional, and international levels.
Any analysis of national governance structures should draw attention to
both the »›politics of education‹ in capitalist societies and to ›education
politics‹ as specific events within governance structures« (Simons,
Olssen, and Peters 2009, 79). We therefore examine pluri-scalar patterns
of coordination since educational reforms in post-spaces are »now being
asked to do different things in different ways, rather than the same
5
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things in different ways« while on the systemic level »the constitution of
education sectors may be in the process of changing, with a development
of parallel sectors at different scales with different responsibilities« (Dale
2005, 117).
In essence, we use Robertson’s (2012) typology as a conceptual approach
to the study of governance activities in post-spaces, and suggest that
these spaces represent a »›condition of the world,‹ ›discourse,‹ ›project,‹
›scale‹ and ›means of identifying the reach of particular actors‹« (35). As
conditions of the world, processes of globalization, American
exceptionalism, neoliberalism, and post-Washington censuses shape
post-spaces. As a discourse, post-spaces are invoked as a means of splitting with the past and constructing a revisionist view of history. As a
project, post-spaces structure the perceptions and scopes through which
particular educational challenges and solutions are framed. Finally, as a
scale, post-spaces allow actors to pick and choose which ideas will be
legitimized and which will be discouraged. Therefore, by empirically
conceptualizing post-spaces, we can begin to see these spaces as part of a
vertical landscape within which we can situate past and present discourses in order to understand »multi-layered and cross cutting proceeds and
modes of interaction« or what has been called »›situatedness‹« or
»embeddedness« (Robertson 2012, 39). In other words, vertical comparisons draw attention to the »politics of knowledge production« (Vavrus
and Bartlett 2006), particularly in an era of regulated governance in
which »[…] nation-states continue to be central players in a globalizing
world, but partly as local agents of global forces, for the nation-state now
operates within global economic constraints« (Marginson and Mollis
2001, 601). Such recognition of the changing role of the nation-state
implies that we need to develop a different empirical approach to situate
the new geo-political educational architecture of power in a globalizing
world.
In returning to the ways in which we can empirically study policy
discourse in post-spaces, »scopic systems in education« (Sobe and
Ortegon 2009) invite us to examine how education, historically and in
6
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the present, has been projected globally. Sobe and Ortegon (2009, 59)
challenge us to use scopic systems in education to think about »projected
realities (and the means of projection)« (59) that are central to »performance legitimacy« (Huntington 1991) in any regime. In heeding this call,
we take Sobe and Ortegon’s (2009) notion of the projection of globality
a bit further by suggesting that the »totality and reflexive
comprehensiveness of projection and reality« (58) is a condition and not a
process, since it is not a result of technological innovation. Globality is
seen as a new »condition or state in which things are global,« which
stems »from conscious and intentional actions of individuals and collective human actors« (Shaw 2000, 17–18). In locating the array of scopic
systems that exist in post-spaces, we focus on identifying how these systems have historically and in the present projected ideas of education.
Educational scopic systems represent a form of power that frames
educational challenges within the policy environment and tries to find
solutions by employing mechanisms that ultimately reinforce social practices over time (Robertson 2011; Robertson 2012). While scopic systems
help us to understand the projectability of globality as constructed
through the national optic, vertical comparisons allow us to »grasp the
complexity of the relationships between the knowledge claims among
actors with different social locations as an attempt to situate local action
and interpretation within a broader cultural, historical, and political
investigation« (Bartlett and Vavrus 2011, 96). In other words, the context
within which post-spaces operate, taking into consideration the »historical trends, social structures and national and international forces [that]
shape local processes« (Vavrus and Bartlett 2006, 96). Vertical comparisons not only help us to understand how projected realities occur in
post-revolutionary spaces, but also focus on understanding how social
interactions are shaped by institutional forces, across nations as well as
across different political periods. These comparisons help us to understand how multilevel dimensions ultimately allow the construction and
subsequent projection of a version of reality that authoritarian regimes
strive to maintain in the form of performance legitimacy. At the end of
the day, legitimacy matters in any post-space, and thus any empirical
7
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study of post-revolutionary or post-authoritarian spaces must consider
the role of performance legitimacy in shaping and constructing a
country’s identity as projected to the rest of the world. For us, vertical
comparisons are ways to explain the claims to legitimacy bolstered by the
persuasive use of state propaganda, the illusion of political inclusiveness,
the supply of standard public goods, and the dispensing of patronage
through client networks (Burnell 2006).
The final element we suggest is critical to understanding post-spaces is a
focus on policyscapes, as notions of globality are projected across different scales within the policy environment. Like Carney, (2009, 2011), we
uses policyscape as a way to understand »the spread of policy ideas and
pedagogical practices across different national school systems« (68).
However, in applying this notion to post-spaces, the aim is to look at
policy diffusion through both vertical and horizontal lenses to capture
the ideological essences that remain after regime implosion, giving rise to
post-spaces that are focused on creating a new imagined community.
Vertical comparisons of scales within post-spaces allow us to draw
attention to the lived consequences of entanglement that exist within an
imagined community. The aim of such a comparative approach is to better understand the horizontal and vertical spatiality of transnational flows
and how they affect educational systems (see Ferguson 2006). Policyscapes allow us to focus on the »time present transitologies« (Cowen
2000) that shape educational systems and spaces in the aftermath of
regime collapse, given the changing nature of regional and international
architecture and their impact upon practices and processes. Transitologies, for Cowen (2000), have a shelf life of 10 years and stem from the
collapse and reconstruction of »(a) state apparatuses; (b) social and
economic stratification systems; and (c) political visions of the future; in
which (d) education is given a major symbolic and reconstructionist role
in these social processes of destroying the past and redefining the future«
(338). If we accept that the Tunisian revolution began December 17,
2010 with the self-immolation of the fruit vendor Tarek al-Tayeb
Mohamed Bouazizi, then Tunisia represents a prime example of how we

8
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should study transitologies in post-spaces by drawing from the vertical
and horizontal scales that exist within the policyscape.
We shall now turn to historicizing Tunisia’s educational systems to show
the emergence of Tunisia’s transitological policyscape.
Transitological educational governance activities in Tunisian
history
As noted above, governance can be broken down into independent
activities—funding, provision, ownership, and regulation—that are
carried out by different actors/institutions (market, community or
household) in addition to the state, thus giving rise to a pluri-scalar
module (Dale 1997). It is therefore the coordination of these independent activities by state and non-state actors/institutions that signals the
rise of governance. This does not mean that the state is absent from
governance activities, in fact the state is still actively present »through its
role as ›coordinator in chief‹ that determines by whom and under what
conditions government will be accomplished« (Dale 2005, 129). However, because of space constraints, the paper will only focus on educational governance activities during transitologies. For us, educational governance activities during political transitions represent a new and distinctive aspect in the study of the rise of pluri-scalar governance in that
»transitological moments« (Cowen 2000) help us to understand the process of rescaling governance activities during times of crisis.
Tunisia’s pre-independence educational system can be categorized in
»pre-protectorate education« and »protectorate education.« Such a
distinction draws attention to the scalar dynamics of educational reform
in Tunisia and to why its subsequent leaders broke from the past to project an »imagined community« around education reform. It is during the
transition from a French protectorate to an independent country in 1956
that we see the evolution of different scales of educational governance
activities as well as how new policyscapes were constructed to protect
these activities. Long before Tunisia became a protectorate of France,
education was of high priority in the North African country. With one of
9
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the most advanced Muslim educational systems in the Maghreb region,
traditional education in the 19th century largely consisted of religious
schools (madrassas). A small percentage of Tunisian children attended
Islamic primary schools, kuttabs, where students learned the Qur’an
thoroughly (Ling 1979). These small schools were often connected to
local mosques and were privately funded. The most promising students
furthered their religious studies by attending city mosques—the most
prestigious among them being Ez Zitouna mosque and university,
located in Tunis (DeGorge 2002; Sizer 1971). Founded in 734 C. E. and
technically a secondary school, Ez Zitouna was considered the most
important center of Islamic scholarship in the Maghreb region (Berry
and Rinehart 1987). In the pre-protectorate period, educational governance activities were imbedded in religiosity, since the curriculum largely
focused on the Arabic language and the Qur’an, with similar pedagogical
methods as kuttabs, albeit much more advanced (Green 1978). The small
number of graduates from the mosque often took positions as Islamic
teachers or judges in Sharia courts, or became members of the Ulama
ranks—an exclusive group of religious leaders (Green 1978; Micaud
1964). As Tunisia began to take steps towards modernization in the 19th
century, Ez Zitouna remained conservative and aimed to keep »Islamic
tradition alive by carrying out its ritual and legal duties« (Sizer 1971, 6).
Gaining acceptance into Ez Zitouna was difficult, with only 800–900
students enrolled annually (Green 1978). Students had to have graduated
with high standing from a kuttab, be at least 12 years old, able to read
and write, and have a large portion of the Qur’an memorized (Sizer
1971). In the 1870s, Prime Minister Khair al-Din, who had lived in
Europe in the 1860s, began to focus his attention on modernizing Tunisian educational institutions, especially Ez Zitouna, whose educational
governance activities were still religiously driven. Since graduates of the
university often held bureaucratic positions, he aimed to reform the
university to match the needs of contemporary Tunisians (Perkins 1986).
In the end, Ez Zitouna and is educational activities remained conservative, with few changes to the curriculum.

10
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On the initiative of Prime Minister Mohammed al Sodok, Sadiki College
(technically a secondary school) was established and opened its doors in
1875. The modern college aimed to train young Tunisians for state service (Perkins 1986) and offered gifted Tunisians lessons in European
languages and sciences (Anderson 1986). Sadiki’s curriculum was divided
into three sections and spanned eight years. The first two sections
covered »the Koran [Qur’an], grammar, literature, rhetoric, logic, and
jurisprudence. The third section was optional and reserved for the most
gifted« (Sizer 1971, 7). Languages offered under the third section consisted of Turkish, French, and Italian. The college also offered instruction in rational sciences, although instructors (some foreign) were advised to »inculcate love of the Faith and to discourage questioning from
the students« (Sizer 1971, 7). The Sadiki design was an »early model of
bilingual and bi-cultural education« (Sizer 1971, 7) and became the standard for future educational endeavors under French rule.
When the French took control of Tunisia in 1881, they found an education system consisting of kuttabs, Ez Zitouna, and Sadiki College. French
officials originally stated that little changes would be made to the Tunisian education system, but a growing European population, from 77,000
in 1895 to 129,000 in 1905, put pressure on the government to provide
more European educational institutions (Sizer 1971). The first
transitological moment of education in Tunisia commenced in 1883
when the education system was placed under la Direction de l’Enseignement
Public, with Louis Machuel appointed Director of Education (Green
1978). Machuel was put in charge of all schools, including religious
institutions. The newly established school system closely resembled and
was integrated with the school system in France (Sizer 1971). By establishing a unified system, officials intended to draw the European and
Tunisian populations together. The institutional expansion of
assimilationist Francophone education policies aimed to create »an elite
cherishing metropolitan values—Black Frenchman« (Clignet and Foster
1964, 191), leading to a centralized political framework with some local
autonomy. For the French administration, the main goal of education
was »that a modern education would facilitate relations between France
11
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and the native people by fostering an understanding of the Arab-Islamic
culture and the newly arrived European cultures« (DeGorge 2002, 580–
81). Further, the government needed an educated Tunisian workforce to
fill government positions. It is within this transition that we see the creation of a separate schooling system and policyscape in which governance
activities are state-motivated and meant to fulfill bureaucratic
requirements.
Taking a modest approach, Louis Machuel left the kuttabs, untouched
and established new Franco-Arab schools to pragmatically instruct both
French and Tunisian students in modern subjects in French. These
schools were loosely modeled after the bi-cultural Sadiki design, with
Arabic and Italian taught as second languages. Some geography of the
North African region was included. The schools were intended to be
open to all citizens (French and Tunisian), but many Tunisian Muslim
students were excluded because of their low proficiency in French (Sizer
1971). Although the schools achieved some success in desegregating
European and Tunisian students, the proportion of French to Tunisian
students remained unequal throughout the protectorate—the schools
never enrolled more than a fifth of the region’s eligible students (Perkins
1986). Along with the new Franco-Arab schools, the French administration also opened a European-style French secondary school, Lycée Carnot,
in 1881. This school utilized the same system as lycées in France, and the
entire staff was French. Again, as in the Franco-Arab schools, the language of instruction was French (DeGorge 2002). Historically, we can see
that the establishment of the Franco-Arabic schools and lycées represents
the first movement of governance activities away from religious control
and towards the rise of the state as chief coordinator within a very
centralized French bureaucratic system. The modern approaches
employed by the new educational division favored a European education
system; traditional Arabic schools and the Arabic language were viewed
as inferior and were paid little heed.
In considering the pluri-scalar appeal of educational governance and the
»tiered nature of political authority in addition to that located nationally«
12
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(Lingard and Rawolle 2011, 99) we suggest that a plausible hypothesis of
educational activities of governance within transitory post-spaces is
driven by educational framings at the political level. For example, one of
the earliest political framings of educational governance activities was the
opening of Sadiki College in 1875, which was a calculated move by
Prime Minister Mohammed al Sodok. The Sadiki design is an example of
how political processes and interactions yield surprisingly effective
educational reforms during different transitological moments, when the
foci of activities, actors/agents, and scales of governance are endogenously developed and reformed to accommodate the structures and
processes of modernity—placing considerable attention on the nationstate, national education systems, and the individual (see Chabbott 2003;
Meyer et al. 1997).
Sadiki College remained the premier center of learning. With its highly
competitive entrance examinations, »its graduates were almost assured
government positions by virtue of their advanced training in modern
subjects and in the increasingly important French language« (Perkins
1986, 88–89). Graduates from Sadiki and the other modern education
establishments began to criticize the recently adopted education system.
They argued for their own society’s need »to make room for concepts
and practices then current in the West but without discarding the AraboIslamic traditions in which it rested« (Perkins 1986, 92). In response to
their concerns, alumni began publishing a new newspaper—al Hadira—
that promoted societal change while maintaining Islamic principles
(Perkins 1896). This led to the opening of a new educational organization in 1896, Khalduniyyah, which was designed to provide a European
curriculum for students attending Zitouna in addition to their Islamic
education (Anderson 1986). Although the Sadiki graduates worked in
tandem with French officials to establish Khaldiuniyya (Micaud 1964),
officials became concerned that the modern education system was »creating an educated elite who could cause political problems« (DeGorge
2002, 583). Their concerns were substantiated; Tunisians became less
passive and more concerned with maintaining their culture while
simultaneously demanding access to schools with modern curricula.
13
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These political reformers became known as Jeunes Tunisiens, named after
the Turkish revolutionaries, the Young Turks (DeGorge 2002). One of
their most salient demands was to make modern education more readily
available to all Tunisians, in both urban and rural areas. As a result, the
Department of Public Education began to deny access to European-style
education for Tunisians (Anderson 1986).
This initial pushback from French officials did not last long. From 1914
to 1942, student attendance and the number of schools established to
educate both Tunisians and the French increased. In 1914, Tunisia’s
education system consisted of 30 private schools and 288 public schools.
Most of the schools were primary schools, along with one lycée for boys,
a secondary school for girls, two colleges, two normal schools, and a
professional school. In 1942, in addition to new primary schools, technical and professional training institutes were opened. Further, jardine
scolaries were established for practical training in agriculture (Sizer 1971).
Finally, putting the educational processes in perspective, a conference
was held in Tunis in 1949 to address educational issues and »proposals
called for teaching methods suitable for the Tunisian child, programs
adapted to local realities, and the use of Arabic as a vehicular language«
(Sizer 1971, 12). The conference, along with a report commissioned by
the French government, brought a twenty-year plan, to fruition, the Plan
de Scolarisation Totale de la Tunisie (1949–1969), which expanded France’s
educational governance activities within Tunisia. The plan addressed
demographic, economic, and cultural concerns within the current education system, such as providing educational options for girls, preparing
students to aid in the development of the country, and the need for an
elite Arab-Muslim class to fill government positions. The plan succeeded
in increasing the population of children receiving an education, but »the
proportion of eligible children in school remained between thirty and
thirty-five percent« (Sizer 1971, 16). Education continued to be for the
elite and wealthy.
In sum, by the 19th century, Tunisian educational governance activities
existed in bifurcated and stratified policyscapes, with a traditional system
14
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dating back centuries and linked to religion, and an elitist, centralized,
French, state-driven system. Individual activities, funding, provision,
ownership, and regulation during the pre-independence period were divided among different entities and across different scales. By the end of
the protectorate in 1956, only ten percent of the population was receiving an education (DeGorge 2002). Traditional Tunisian schools were
nearly the same as in the pre-protectorate era, and the »French system
was merely juxtaposed to it, more modern in outlook, but transposed
directly from France with little adaption to local needs« (Sizer 1971, 18).
Although the reforms brought about during French rule created more
schools, they also created an educational space that was highly complex
and incongruous.
Transitologies and imagined post-spaces
In post-spaces, the broader narratives of transitologies show traces of
Robertson’s (2012) typology discussed above, especially the condition,
discourse, project, and scale that define government mechanisms.
Whereas governance activities were splintered in the protectorate period,
a vertical comparison shows that during the independence period, governance activities were streamlined under the control of the state apparatus. In applying Robertson’s (2012) conceptual approach to the study of
governance activities, we suggest that in post-spaces, conditions of the
world shape notions of modernity as embedded in post-colonial projects
that in turn fashion the activities of governances. We see the project as
challenges confronting educational activities, framed in a way that
prioritizes the state’s agenda. Discourse uses transitologies to project an
illusion of what can be possible once there is a radical discontinuity from
the past and scale constitutes the ways in which actors frame reform.
Cowen (2000) warns that transitologies are dramatic and occur quickly;
however our HPA shows that Tunisia’s post-independence educational
transitologies are now in their third wave. The first wave of transitologies
began in the post-independence period of Tunisia’s release from France
as a protectorate, when the educational policyscape was transferred to
the new post-protectorate administration.
15
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In 1957, the French proclaimed Tunisia a republic and subsequently
named Habib Bourguiba—»father of the nation,« »Supreme Warrior,«
and »Combatant, Supreme«—president. Bourguiba swiftly placed education at the forefront of his agenda, and stressed the importance of education for social advancement (Rossi 1967). Bourguiba’s governmental
activities placed emphasis on expanding educational access, both in
urban and in rural areas, to provide more opportunities for all children in
Tunisia, not solely the elite. The country had a long way to go—at
Independence »less than one quarter of Tunisian children were in primary schools, and fewer than five percent of the school-aged population
had been exposed to modern secondary education« (Berry and Rinehart
1987, 128). The Education Act of 1958 attempted to remedy this. Within
the post-protectorate policyscape created by Bourguiba, all educational
governance activities were absorbed with developing the necessary
human resources for the modernization project as conceived by him.
The fundamental tenants of Bourguiba’s modernization project, and the
evolution of appropriate governance activities, were voiced within the
1956 Code du Statut Personnel (Code of Personal Status) that went into
effect in 1957. The code prohibited polygamy, granted women and men
the same rights, introduced a minimum age for marriage, permitted
women to initiate divorce, and mandated the right to education for
women. As part of Bourguiba’s new educational policyscape, school
curricula and textbooks were modernized to reduce religious influence
while simultaneously widening participation.
The 1958 ten-year education plan not only addressed educational access
and expansion, but also aimed at both the unification and Tunisification
of the country (Fryer and Jules 2012; Sizer 1971). This move thus
cemented the government’s role, a clear change in governance practices.
In the post-protectorate policyscape, the Tunisification process was
embedded in the governance activity of regulation. Bourguiba’s aim was
to ensure that education was a central component of the state apparatus.
The Tunisification process had three core elements: »(i) evoking history;
(ii) enhancing culture and religion; and (iii) promoting gender equity«
(Fryer and Jules 2012). Education in the immediate post-independence
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period used »education to create citizen-subjects […] in which
Westernization and Tunisian Islamic culture would be ›synthesized‹«
(Champagne 2007, 204). After decades of French rule, the country
needed to establish a unique Tunisian identity. Further, the government
desired a cadre of workers that could replace French personnel and
improve the economic conditions of the country. All educational
institutions were first placed under one secular institution (DeGorge
2002), the Ministry of Education (MOE), which strove to reform education from the ground up. Higher education reform was placed on hold
until more Tunisian youths were prepared for university level courses
(Sizer 1971). Although the plan set out to transform the current education system, the French model still provided the framework for the
Tunisian government.
Universal primary education, free to all Tunisian children, was the first
goal—set to be accomplished by 1968 (Sizer 1971). Every child had the
right to primary education; however, secondary education was designed
to be more selective. Beginning at age six, Tunisian children were to
attend primary school for a total of seven years. Soon after the national
plan went into effect, overcrowding issues arose and the quality of
education deteriorated (Allman 1979). Further, there was a shortage of
qualified teachers and space. To rectify these issues, the MOE cut weekly
school hours in half during the first two years of primary school, from
30 to 15, which allowed schools to operate in shifts. Students attended
school for 25 hours a week and the seventh year of primary school was
eliminated (Allman 1979; Sizer 1971). Utilizing a bilingual approach,
students were taught in Arabic for the first two years and then were
instructed for ten hours a day in French from the third year on. While
the French model of schooling continued to permeate the Tunisian
educational infrastructure, the Tunisification, or nationalization, of Tunisia became an integral part of the revamped education system (Sizer
1971).
The Education Act limited secondary education, which was considered
selective, but not elitist. Entrance was gained through high scores on a
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competitive national exam taken during the last year of primary school.
The duration of secondary school was six years. However, after the first
year of general instruction, students were tracked into different fields—
making students more adept in certain subjects (Allman 1979). Early
specialization also aimed to prepare students for universities, specifically
universities considered more modern. After Independence and the
centralization of governance activities under the state, religious institutions lost their appeal and were considered impractical (Micaud 1964). Ez
Zitouna’s prestige wavered, especially after the creation of the University
of Tunis in 1960, which catered to students who wished to fill positions
formerly held by the French or students who wished to go abroad for
work or study (Rossi 1967).
For the most post, Tunisians considered the reforms successful. By
1967, 90 percent of school-aged boys and 50 percent of girls were receiving a primary education (Sizer 1971). However, a report released in the
same year resulted in some alterations to the 1958 plan. As more students attended school, issues relating to educational quality became
prevalent. In some areas, primary education was increased to the original
30 hours a week, and all primary classrooms became co-educational. The
plan also encouraged smaller class sizes (Sizer 1971).
Throughout the rest of Bourguiba’s presidency, he focused on the governance activity of educational provision that contributed to the rise in
school attendance in primary school and secondary school. However,
low quality remained an on-going issue. The University of Tunis continued to expand and gain prestige, although many qualified students
chose to attend universities abroad. All things considered, by the mid1980s the reforms did what they had intended—most primary and
secondary school teachers were Tunisian rather than French, school
attendance drastically increased (DeGorge 2002), and more attention was
brought to the distinctive culture and language of the Tunisian people.
This, of course, did not occur without considerable investments. From
1980–1990, 27 percent of the state budget was spent on national
education.
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In 1988, the second transitological moment occurred as the postBourguiba imagined community was constructed by Ben Ali after he
took office. The »palace coup« that brought the peaceful transition from
Bourguiba to Ben Ali, known as le Changement (the change), was dominated by le Pacte National (the National Pact)—political and economic
reforms to encourage foreign investment (Borowiec 1998). In the postBourguiba policyscape, we see the rise of three myths (the economic
miracle, democratic gradualism, and laicite) that shaped educational
governance activities, ultimately providing fertile ground for the rise of
the post-Ben Ali policyscape. While Ben Ali preserved and expanded the
foundational attributes of Bourguiba’s educational governance activities
to guarantee political stability and security under the »presidential
democracy« system, several myths permeated the post-Bourguiba space.
Ben Ali wanted to distance himself wherever possible from Bourguiba’s
educational governance activities, which were founded on Western ideas
and the principle of modernization. The three myths mentioned above
are central to the ways in which education was projected in the postBourguiba period and has its roots in the 1989 education reforms that
sought to »reshape [educational] structures according to a rational
approach that takes into account the national reality, inspired of success
instances worldwide« (MOEHRST 2008, 71) and provided »compulsory
and free basic schooling […] redefined the mission and finalities of
education, restructured secondary education« (MOET 2002, 10–11). This
reform not only sought to respond to the gaps in student performance
across the system, but was also Ben Ali’s way of suggesting to the
international community that not only was Tunisia serious about addressing its educational deficits, but also that Tunisia embraced modernity
and democratic governance. However Cavatorta and Haugbølle (2012)
suggest that this projection of embracing modernization and educational
reforms was a myth. In 2002, Ben Ali engaged upon the second set of
reforms in the post-Bourguiba era. Ben Ali’s reforms were based on
»social liberalism« (Mbougueng 1999), since they adopted aspects of neoliberal market reforms in conjunction with heavy state intervention in
the social sector. In this context, the Educational Reform Act states that
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»education aims at cultivating fidelity and loyalty in students to Tunisia«
(MOET 2002, 5) while increasing their »capacity for self-education and
[…] prepar[ing] them for access to the educated community« (MOET
2002, 9). The link between Ben Ali’s aim to develop an educated populace while projecting the notion of himself as a democratic leader was the
Tunisian economic miracle […] [where the leadership sought] to
tackle the most pressing problems of the country and then
generate sufficient growth to be able to defuse social tensions in
order to open up the political system without risking the growth of
Islamic extremism (read Islamism), as economic success could be
used to undermine the attraction of political Islam. (Cavatorta and
Haugbølle 2012, 183).
During the post-Bourguiba era, Ben Ali increased spending on education
—6.3 percent of the gross national product in 1993—and focused
attention on cultivating competencies, including: (i) practical (mathematics, science, computer science, and technology); (ii) strategic (organize,
analyze, and search for correct information); (iii) initiative (spirit of
creativity); and (iv) behavioral (senses of responsibility, self-reliance, and
cooperation (MOEHRST 2008). There is no clear evidence whether
there is a connection to the investment in education, but Tunisia’s
annual growth rate did increase from 5 to 6 percent between 1996 and
2005. In 2005, another set of educational reforms called for »a large
scientific and technological partnership with overseas« (MOEHRST
2008, 155) as part of »Tunisia Tomorrow«—a set of reforms introduced
in 2005 that focused on technological partnerships. In light of these
reforms, it is ironic that one of the most important reasons for the postBen Ali transitology period was high unemployment among young
people, especially university graduates, which rose from 30 percent in
2009 to 45 percent in 2011. Distinctive in the development of the postBourguiba space is the movement from the process of Tunisification
towards liberalization of entry into the global market. For example, while
reforms drew on Tunisia’s historical past, they also projected a sense of
Ben Ali’s performance legitimation in that higher education reforms sug20
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gest »the university will […] boost the comprehensive process of economic development. It will remain an inexhaustible source of creation and
innovation […] So that Tunisia remains forever, the symbol of science,
culture and civilization which it has always been throughout history«
(15). As part of Ben Ali’s projection of democratic values, the postBourguiba era continued to promote »absolute equality among the
sexes,« which was considered »the best means of social promotion«
(MOET 2003, 17). The idea of competing internally and externally
permeated the post-Bourguiba space, as education was expected to generate a »link between training and the labour market at the regional and
national level« (MOET 2008, 19).
Conclusion: Educational contagion
In examining the role of educational developments in post-spaces, we
suggest that several small internal shocks to Tunisia’s educational system
were driven by political fluctuations and transformations. These ultimately led to the tsunami of policy solutions that have altered the Tunisian landscape, giving rise to education contagion—the spreading of
ideas due to spillovers. In essence, one conceivable supposition is that
educational contagion is a byproduct of the educational governance
activities that are utilized during different transitological moments.
In focusing on the evolutionary dynamics of governance activities,
transitological moments within transitologies, we suggest that future
research should now be able to identify how activities eventually spilled
over as transitological periods expanded. Essentially, while the postprotectorate policyscape cemented governance activities under the state
apparatus to achieve modernization in the post-Bourguiba policyscape, le
Changement was utilized to consolidate crucial decisions under the
»presidential system« in the post-Ben Ali policyscape, which continues to
be an extension of earlier scales of governance activities. Thus educational contagion, or the spillover effects, ultimately cemented the seeds of
the Tunisian Uprising, or »Jasmine Revolution« as coined by the Western
media, and the ensuing Arab Spring. Based on our analysis, we suggest
that the Tunisian Uprising not only went against the dictatorship per se,
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but also against the policyscapes that different governance activities had
created, expanded, and maintained over time. After all, it was the
centralized bureaucratic system that funded, provided, owned, and
regulated the independent activities of education, and it was the products
of the system, its human capital, that rose up against the state apparatus
when they could not find employment. While we recognize that several
factors contributed to the demise of the Ben Ali regime after 23 years of
governance, we advance that educational contagion ultimately shaped the
pre-revolutionary events and the extent to which they spilled over, given
that 43.7% of the population were aged 15–39 and were products of
post-protectorate governance activities. An example of educational contagion can be seen in the evolution of political slogans as the uprisings
progressed from an initial call for »employment is a right, oh gang of
thieves« and »bread and water, not Trabulsis3« to calls that »the people
want to bring down the regime« (Sadiqi 2011, 21). Other slogans, such as
»the people want to topple the regime,« invoked aspects of the work of
the Tunisian poet Abu al-Qasim al-Shabbi, who died in 1933 at age 25.
In returning briefly to the situatedness or embeddedness of transversal
comparisons, a second example illustrates how, as the state cemented
control of the various educational governance activities in the postBourguiba policyscape, endogenous actors were used to protect and
legitimize this space. It is within the context that the mukhabarat became
the disciplinary arm of the neo-corporatist security state that arose in the
post-Bourguiba policyscape. The mukhabarat had its hands in all
educational governance activities, since it infiltrated all spheres of Tunisian society as Ben Ali consolidated his presidential democracy. At its
height, there were close to a 130,000 mukhabarat employed to protect the
security of the state, with the university system having its own heavyhanded mukhabarat division, which functioned in an atmosphere of
impunity and maintained an air of fear to keep university students and
officials in line.
3

Refers collectively to the family members of Leïla Ben Ali, second wife
of President Zine El Abidine Ben Al.
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In putting forth educational contagion as a theoretical module with
which to understand the multi-scalarity and multi-spatiality that exists in
post-authoritarian spaces, we trace the metamorphoses of educational
policies within Tunisia’s authoritarian space to examine the
conceptualization and actualizations of empirical research on education.
The post-Ben Ali periods have begun with destroying and discrediting
the historical, social, and professional past (Cowen 2002). In this paper
we have made two observations: (i) we have advanced a way of studying
post-spaces in the hope that we can better understand the type of
transitological processes that states go through as different educational
systems are restructured after the collapse of a regime and (ii) we have
suggested that in the case of Tunisia, the transitological process has
given rise to educational contagion at different policyscales. In the postspace, projected globality is not embedded in the governances negotiated, but instead stems from educational contagion. In essence, over time
these various projections have occurred in small shocks that now shape
Tunisian society within the post-space.

23

Jules and Barton, Educational governance activities

InterDisciplines 2 (2014)

References
Anderson, Lisa 1986. The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya,
1830–1980. Princeton.
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism. London.
Allen, Franklin, and Douglas Gale. 2000. »Financial Contagion.« Journal of Political Economy 108 (1): 1–33. Last accessed November 6, 2014.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/262109.
Allman, James. 1979. Social Mobility, Education and Development in Tunisia. Leiden.
Bartlett, Lesley, and Frances Vavrus. 2011. »Knowing Comparatively: Vertical
Case Studies as an Approach to Policy as Practice.« Paper presented to
CIES, Montreal, May 1–5.
Berry, LaVerle, and Robert Rinehart. 1987. »The Society and its Environment.«
In Tunisia: A Country Study, edited by H. D. Nelson, 71–144. Washington,
D.C.
Borowiec, Andrew. 1998. Modern Tunisia: A Democratic Apprenticeship. Santa
Barbara, CA.
Brown, Leon Carl. 1964. »Stages in the Process of Change.« In Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization, edited by C. A. Micaud, 3–37. New York.
Burnell, Peter J. 2006. »Autocratic Opening to Democracy: Why Legitimacy
Matters.« Third World Quarterly 27 (4): 545–62. doi: 10.1080
/01436590600720710.
Carney, Stephen. 2009. »Negotiating Policy in an Age of Globalization: Exploring Educational ›Policyscapes‹ in Denmark, Nepal, and China.« Comparative Education Review 53 (1): 63–88.
Cavatorta, Francesco, and Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle. 2012. »The End of
Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali.«
Mediterranean Politics 17 (2): 179–95. Last accessed November 6, 2014.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2012.694043.

24

Jules and Barton, Educational governance activities

InterDisciplines 2 (2014)

Cowen, Robert. 2000. »Comparing Futures or Comparing Past?« Comparative
Education 36 (3): 333–42. Last accessed November 6, 2014. http://www
.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713656619.
Chabbott, Colette. 2003. Constructing Education for Development: International
Organizations and Education for All. New York.
Chomiak, Laryssa, and John P. Entelis. 2011. »The Making of North Africa’s
Intifadas.« Middle East Report 259: 8–15.
Clignet, Remi P., and Phillip L. Foster. 1964. »French and British Colonial
Education in Africa.« Comparative Education Review 8 (2): 191–98.
Dale, Roger. 2005. »Globalisation, Knowledge Economy and Comparative
Education.« Comparative Education 41 (2): 117–49. doi: 10.1080
/03050060500150906.
—— 1997. »The State and the Governance of Education: An Analysis of the
Restructuring of the State-Education Relationship.« In Education, Culutre,
Economy and Society, edited by A. H. Halsey, H. Lauder, P. Brown, and S.
Wells, 273–82. Oxford.
DeGorge, Barbara. 2002. »The Modernization of Education: A Case Study of
Tunisia and Morocco.« The European Legacy 7 (5): 579–96. doi: 10.1080
/1084877022000006780.
Green, Arnold H. 1978. The Tunisian Ulama, 1873–1915: Social Structure and
Response to Ideological Currents. Leiden.
Ferguson, James. 2006. Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order.
Durham, NC.
Fryer, Landis G., and Tavis D. Jules. 2013. »Policy Spaces and Educational
Development in the Islamic Maghreb Region: Higher Education in Tunisia.« International Perspectives on Education and Society 21: 401–25.
Hanberger, Anders. 2003. »Public Policy and Legitimacy: A Historical Policy
Analysis of the Interplay of Public Policy and Legitimacy.« Policy Sciences
36 (3): 257–78.
Heryanto, Ariel, and Vedi R. Hadiz. 2005. »Post-authoritarian Indonesia.« Critical Asian Studies 37 (2): 251–75. doi: 10.1080/14672710500106341.

25

Jules and Barton, Educational governance activities

InterDisciplines 2 (2014)

Hibou, Béatrice, Hamza Meddeb, and Mohamed Hamdi. 2011. »Tunisia after
14 January and its Social and Political Economy.« Report for the EuroMediterranean Human Rights Network, Copenhagen, June 2011.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. »Democracy's Third Wave.« Journal of Democracy 2
(2): 12–34.
Jules, Tavis D. 2013a. »Ideological Pluralism and Revisionism in Small (and
Micro) States: The Erection of the Caribbean Education Policy Space.«
Globalisation, Societies and Education 11 (2): 258–75.
—— 2013b. »Going Trilingual: Post-revolutionary Socialist Education Reform
in Grenada.« The Round Table 102 (5): 459–70.
Larsen, Marianne A. 2010. New Thinking in Comparative Education: Honouring
Robert Cowen. Rotterdam.
Ling, Dwight L. 1979. Morocco and Tunisia: A Comparative Study. Washington,
DC.
Lingard, Bob, and Shaun Rawolle. 2011. »New Scalar Politics  : Implications for
Education Policy.« Comparative Education: An International Journal of
Comparative Studies 47 (4): 489–502.
Mbougueng, Valentin. 1999. Ben Ali et le mode`le Tunisien. Paris.
Meyer, John W., J. Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997.
»World Society and the Nation State.« American Journal of Sociology 103 (1):
144–81.
Micaud, Charles A. 1964. Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization. New York.
Ministry of Education and Training (MOET). 2002. Education act, July 23,
2002. Tunis.
—— 2003. »The New Education Reform in Tunisia: An Education Strategy
for the Future, 2002–2007.« Tunis.
—— 2008. »The Development of Education in Tunisia, 2004–2008.« National
report, Tunis.
Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technology
(MOHESRT). 2008. »The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Tunisian University, 1958–2008.« Tunis.

26

Jules and Barton, Educational governance activities

InterDisciplines 2 (2014)

Mundy, Karen. 2007. »Global Governance, Educational Change.« Comparative
Education 43 (3): 339–57. doi: 10.1080/03050060701556281.
Perkins, Kenneth J. 1986. Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European Worlds.
Boulder, CO.
Pickard, Duncan. 2011. »Challenges to Legitimate Governance in Post-revolution Tunisia.« Journal of North African Studies 16 (4): 637–52.
Robertson, Susan L. 2010. »The EU, ›Regulatory State Regionalism‹ and New
Modes of Higher Education Governance.« Globalisation, Societies and
Education 8 (1): 23–37. doi:10.1080/14767720903574033.
Robertson, Susan L., Xavier Bonal, and Roger Dale. 2002. »GATS and the
Education Service Industry: The Politics of Scale and Global
Reterritorialization.« Comparative Education Review 46 (4): 472–95.
doi:10.1086/343122.
Rossi, Pierre. 1967. Bourguiba’s Tunisia. Translated by Ronald Mathews. Tunis.
Sadiki, Larbi. 2002. »The Search for Citizenship in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy versus Unity.« Political Studies 50 (3) 497–513. doi: 10.1111
/1467-9248.00381/full.
—— 2011. »Tunisia: Revolution of the Citizenry … a Revolution without a
Head.« The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Doha. Last
accessed November 6, 2014. http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/get
/7f179303-b35c-4525-a803-37c260a2607e.pdf.
Schraeder, Peter J., and Hamadi Redissi. 2011. »Ben Ali’s Fall.« Journal of
Democracy 22 (3): 5–19. doi:10.1353/jod.2011.0047.
Schram, Sanford F. 1993. »Postmodern Policy Analysis: Discourse and Identity
in Welfare Policy.« Policy Sciences 26: 249–70.
Schriewer, Jürgen. 2002. »Educación Comparada: Un gran programa ante nuevos desafıós.« In Formación del discurso en la educación comparada, edited by J.
Schriewer, 13–40. Barcelona.
Simons, Maarten, Mark Olssen, and Michael Peters. 2009. »Re-Reading Education Policies: Part 2; Challenges, Horizons, Approaches, Tools,
Styles.« In Re-Reading Education Policies: A Handbook for Studying the Policy

27

Jules and Barton, Educational governance activities

InterDisciplines 2 (2014)

Agenda of the 21st Century, edited by Maarten Simons, Mark Olssen,
Michael Peters, 26–95. Rotterdam.
Sizer, Catherine Tompkins. 1971. »The Development of Education in Tunisia.«
Master’s thesis, The American University, Washington, DC.
Sobe, Noah W., and Nicole D. Ortegón. 2009. »Scopic Systems, Pipes, Models
and Transfers in the Global Circulation of Educational Knowledge and
Practices.« Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education 108 (2):
49–66.
Torgerson, Douglas. 1996. »Power and Insight in Policy Discourse: Postpositivism and Problem Definition.« In Policy Studies in Canada: The State
of the Art, edited by H. M. Dobuzinskis and D. Laycock, 266–98.
Toronto.
Vavrus, Frances, and Lesley Bartlett. 2006. »Comparatively Knowing: Making a
Case for the Vertical Case Study.« Current Issues in Comparative Education 8
(2): 95–103.
Verger, Antoni. 2009. »The Merchants of Education: Global Politics and the
Uneven Education Liberalization Process within the WTO.« Comparative
Education Review 53 (3): 379–401.
Youngs, Richard. 2011. »The EU and the Arab Spring: From Munificence to
Geo-strategy.« Policy Brief, FRIDE 100: 1–6.
***
Tavis D. Jules and Teresa Barton, Loyola University Chicago: tjules@luc.edu.

28

29

